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Mississippi's ADOPTION OF RULE 35 INDEPENDENT MEDICAL
EXAMINATIONS: A WHOLE NEW CAN OF WORMS
Pieter Teeuwissen *
I. INTRODUCTION
You are sitting in a cold, sterile examining room. Yet another doctor is
going to examine you for the same condition, and this involves more questions,
more tests, and more probes. You are wondering: why so many doctors, why so
many tests? You are nervous, as you always are when seeing the doctor. Only
this visit is a little more uncomfortable because you do not know this doctor and
you did not choose this examination. You do not know what will happen in the
examination or how long it will take. And to make the situation worse, you are
not allowed to have any family members with you. You are all alone with a
stranger who is receiving payment from an adverse party to examine you and
contest your medical status.
Mississippi has now joined most other states and the federal courts by enact-
ing a rule providing for the independent medical examination (IME) of a plain-
tiff.' While this rule is new to Mississippi, issues surrounding IME's have been
addressed by numerous other jurisdictions. A review of other jurisdictions gives
both guidance and pause with respect to issues that Mississippi litigators will
encounter. This article will briefly detail the history of the IME in Mississippi,
the enactment of the new Rule 35, and the future issues our courts will probably
address. While this article is speculative by nature, what is certain is that Rule
35 will complicate litigation.
II. HISTORY AND ENACTMENT OF RULE 35
Rule 35 was enacted pursuant to the Mississippi Supreme Court's authority
to promulgate various rules of civil procedure, which "emanates from . . . the
separation of powers and vesting of judicial powers in the courts."2 That court
found its authority in section 144 of the Mississippi Constitution.'
Despite having rule-making authority, the Mississippi Supreme Court did
not adopt the IME rule when the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure were orig-
inally enacted in 1984. The omission of an IME rule was especially pronounced
since the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure were explicitly modeled after the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The omission was addressed in Swan v. LP., Inc. 4 Nancy Swan was a Long
Beach Junior High School teacher who alleged physical injuries as a result of
exposure to fumes and spray of polyurethane roofing materials.' During discov-
* J.D., University of Minnesota. Managing Partner, Danks & Teeuwissen, Jackson, Mississippi.
1. See Miss. R. Crv. P. 35.
2. Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71, 76 (Miss. 1975).
3. Id. at 76. Section 144 simply states that "[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme
Court and such other courts as are provided for in this constitution."
4. Swan v. I.P. Inc., 613 So. 2d 846 (Miss. 1993).
5. Id. at 847-48.
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ery, the defendants wanted Swan to submit to an IME by an expert neurologist
designated by the defendants.' The trial court refused to order an IME.r With
two main opinions, the Mississippi Supreme Court was wildly divided. The
majority held that the omission of Rule 35 precluded a trial court from ordering
an examination under any circumstances since "the subject of Rule 35 is beyond
the scope of the legislation pursuant to which the Mississippi rules were adopt-
ed."
9
In a harbinger of things to come, Chief Justice Hawkins dissented (joined by
then-Justice Pittman)." He took issue with the majority's absolute holding that
"no trial court ever has any authority to order a personal injury plaintiff to under-
go any kind of medical examination by a qualified physician."1 This was sim-
ply "the wrong answer."1 2 Notwithstanding the perceived conflict, the
Mississippi Supreme Court would not address the IME issue again for nearly ten
years.
III. MississiPPi RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 35
The year 2002 was a well-publicized year in the fight over so-called "tort
reform," with Mississippi seeing a flood of special interest advertisements and an
expensive and exhaustive special session of the Legislature to address the prob-
lem. The Mississippi College Law Review even dedicated a symposium to the
topic.13 It seems that the state supreme court, perhaps sensing that it had an
opportunity to balance the increasingly bipolar sides, passed a number of revi-
sions to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Among these revisions was
the January 16, 2003 enactment of a new Rule 35-and not just the blank that
held the place for years.
Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a) is relatively straight-forward as
written and easily breaks down into several important elements. When a physi-
cal or mental condition is in controversy, the trial court may order a party to sub-
mit to an IME." The trial court's order may be made only on motion for good
cause shown. The provisions applicable to motions generally control form.8
6. Id. at 858.
7. Id.
8. Chief Justice Hawkins wrote the first part of the court's opinion. He also concurred with Parts I and II-
A, along with Justices Lee, Prather, Sullivan, Pittman, Banks, and McRae. Only Hawkins, Prather, Sullivan,
Pittman, and Banks concurred with Part II-B, while Justice McRae concurred separately, joined by Justice Lee.
Justice Sullivan wrote for the court beginning with Part II-C. Justices Sullivan, Lee, Prather, Banks, and
McRae concurred in Part II-C. Chief Justice Hawkins also dissented from Part II-C in a separate written opin-
ion that Justice Pittman joined. Justice Roberts and Smith were precluded from voting.
9. Swan, 613 So. 2d at 858 (examining the original comment to Miss. R. Civ. P. 35).
10. Id. at 859.
11. Id. at 860 (Hawkins, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 859 (Hawkins, C.J., dissenting).
13. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposed Remedy for Mississippi's Medical Malpractice Miseries, 22 Miss.
C. L. REv. 1 (2002); Neil Vidmar & Leigh Anne Brown, Tort Reform and the Medical Liability Insurance
Crisis in Mississippi: Diagnosing the Disease and Prescribing a Remedy, 22 Miss. C. L. REv. 9 (2002).
14. Miss. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
15. Id.
16. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1191 (2d ed.
1987).
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Likewise, provisions of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) governing
protective orders should apply to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 35.17 The
trial court's order for an IME must specify the time, place, manner, conditions
and scope of the examination and the person who shall administer the examina-
tion.18 The party requesting the examination shall bear all costs, and the exami-
nation shall not require unreasonable travel. 9
Mississippi Rule 35(b) addresses the gathering of information during an IME
and how this information is disseminated. Rule 35(b)(1) endeavors to have all
parties share any information gathered from an IME, including the examiner's
findings, test results, diagnoses and conclusions." Subsection (b)(2) addresses
waiver of the privilege and thus reconciles Rule 35 with Rule 503(f).21 The only
specific limitations placed on the applicability of Rule 35 are enunciated in sub-
section (6).22
Mississippi Rule 35 is modeled in general after Federal Rule 35. Besides the
deletion of two superfluous commas in the Federal Rule, Mississippi's Rule 35
makes two notable changes to the Federal Rule. First, an addition provides that
"[a] party or person may not be required to travel an unreasonable distance for an
examination. The party requesting the examination shall pay the examiner and
shall advance all necessary expenses to be incurred by the party or person in
complying with the order."2 This perhaps mitigates the sting of Rule 35.
Second, there is a section entitled "Limited Applicability to Actions Under Title
93 of the Mississippi Code of 1972" stating that "[t]his rule does not apply to
actions under Title 93 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, except in the discretion
of the Chancery Judge."24
IV. ISSUES ARISING FROM RULE 35
While the Mississippi state courts lacked a proper Rule 35 for years, any liti-
gator practicing in the federal courts of Mississippi was faced with the IME rule
for decades, via Federal Rule 35. Over sixty years ago, a plaintiff who claimed
to have lost sight in one eye was ordered to undergo an independent medical
examination.25 It was held to be within the sound judgment of the court to
decide which physician should make the examination, as opposed to accepting
the physician recommended by the defendant.26 This conflict between the state
and federal courts of Mississippi gave rise to the holding that a Rule 35 examina-
tion in federal court would waive the physician-patient privilege promulgated in
17. Id. at §§ 2035-44.
18. Miss. R. Crv. P. 35(a).
19. Id.
20. Miss. R. CIv. P. 35(b)(1).
21. Miss. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2).
22. Miss. R. Crv. P. 35(c).
23. Id.
24. Id. Title 93 is the Domestic Code.
25. Leach v. Greif Bros. Cooperage Corp., 2 F.R.D. 444,446 (S.D. Miss. 1942).
26. Id.
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state statutes.2 ' Regrettably, parties in federal court began pursuing various
methods to exert influence over the supposedly independent examination.28
With the newness of Rule 35, our supreme court has not had an opportunity
to address application of the rule or interpret the language of the rule. For exam-
ple, how does counsel determine the scope of an examination? Can counsel
videotape the IME? Can the plaintiff have someone present during the IME?
What happens when counsel for the respective parties cannot agree who should
perform the independent examination? These are but a few of the practical
aspects of Rule 35 that our courts must address. Until Mississippi case law is
established, we must look to other jurisdictions for guidance.
What follows is an alphabetical review of other jurisdictions and how they
have addressed who may accompany the plaintiff during an IME issue.
Alaska
The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure do not directly address the issue of the
presence of another individual accompanying the plaintiff during an IME.25
However, in Langfeldt-Haaland v. Saupe Enterprises, the Alaska Supreme Court
held an attorney's protection and advice may be needed in the context of an
opposing party's medical examination and saw no good reason why the attorney
should not be available." The function of the attorney is limited to that of an
observer. Counsel may take notes and save his or her comments for making
objections during the trial and/or cross-examination of the doctor. 2 The Alaska
Supreme Court stated this very important legal point:
First, there is a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases aris-
ing from the due process clause. We recognize that the right to
counsel in civil cases is not co-extensive with the right to coun-
sel in criminal prosecutions, but in the area of compelled exami-
nations, we see no reason to draw a distinction. Second, counsel
may observe shortcomings and improprieties in an examination
which can be brought out during cross-examination at either a
civil or criminal trial. Third, although observation may be the
primary role of counsel in both criminal and civil cases, counsel
may on occasion properly object to questions concerning privi-
leged information. There are privileges which may be invaded
in civil as well as criminal cases.3
27. Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1242 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
28. See, e.g., Ewing v. Ayers Corp., 129 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Miss. 1989). In Ewing, the attorneys for the
plaintiffs and the defendants were both adjudged to have contacted a doctor impermissibly. Id. at 138-39.
29. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 35.
30. 768 P.2d 1144, 1144-45 (Alaska 1989).
31. Id. at 1145.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1146.
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Arizona
In Burton v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, the issue of monitoring of
the IME was addressed in the workers' compensation setting. 4 The Arizona
Court of Appeals held that the examination could be tape recorded. 5
"Respondents assert that the use of a tape recorder turns the examination into a
direct adversarial proceeding. We disagree. A tape recorder operates silently,
asks no questions, and merely records any audible sounds."36
California
In Sharff v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that a party
compelled to submit to a physical examination is entitled to have an attorney
present." In Gonzi v. Superior Court, that same court held that either party is
also entitled to request the presence of a court reporter.8
Delaware
In Rochen v. Huang, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a patient can
have another health care professional of her choice present to observe the pro-
ceedings or have the examination electronically recorded. 9
Florida
In Cinino v. United States Security Insurance Co., the Florida appeals court
reiterated that an injured party is entitled to have an attorney present or to video-
tape a mental or physical examination scheduled by or on behalf of an insurance
company."
Idaho
In Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in the
workers' compensation setting, an employee's tape-recording of an examination
did not rise to the level of an unreasonable obstruction of the examination. 1
Indiana
In Jacob v. Chaplin, the Indiana Supreme Court held that any party to the lit-
igation, as well as the examiner, may record all aspects of the examination. "2
"The specific question that appellants . present for review is whether a party
34. 801 P.2d 473, 474 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
35. Id. at 476-77.
36. Id. at 477.
37. 282 P.2d 896, 897 (Cal. 1955).
38. 335 P.2d 97, 98-99 (Cal. 1959).
39. 558 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Del. 1988).
40. 715 So. 2d 1092, 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Toucet v. Big Ben Moving and Storage, 581
So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1991)).
41. 814 P.2d424, 429 (Idaho 1991).
42. 639 N.E.2d 1010, 1012-13 (Ind. 1994).
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who is subject to a court-ordered medical examination may tape record all con-
versations that the party has with the examining physician at the time of the
examination."43 The Court rejected the defendants' argument that taping would
impede the court-ordered examiner's ability to conduct a fair and complete
examination.' Specifically, the court stated:
It is inherent in such an important meeting that both exam-
inerand examinee be permitted to choose whether or not to make
written notes of the verbal exchange. It follows from this con-
clusion that both should as well be permitted to choose whether
or not, in lieu of the laborious process of making notes, to open-
ly record the verbal exchange by electronic means. In permit-
ting the examination ordered in this case to be recorded, the trial
court properly exercised its discretion and recognized the just-
ness of permitting recording to take place in an open manner, in
the absence of some overriding reason to prohibit recording. We
also fail to see any reason why electronic recording of the
examination would in and of itself impede an examiner's ability
to conduct a fair and complete examination.
Louisiana
In Robin v. Associated Indemnity Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
an injured litigant is not precluded from having a lawyer present at an examina-
tion by a physician selected by the adverse party. 6
Minnesota
In Wood v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co., the
Minnesota appeals court held that an attorney may be present during an examina-
tion unless there is some valid reason why he or she should not be allowed to be
present.47 The party objecting to the attorney being present has the burden of
proof and must obtain a court order directing that the attorney not be present:
The discovery rules are designed to be tools for the elicitation of
the truth. To require routinely that attorneys be present during
adverse medical examinations is to thrust the adversary process
itself into the physician's examining room. The most competent
and honorable physicians in the community would predictably
be the most sensitive to such adversarial intrusions. The more
partisan physicians might feel challenged to outwit the attorney.
Thus, we fear that petitioner's suggested remedy would only
43. Id. at 1011.
44. Id. at 1013.
45. Id.
46. 297 So. 2d427, 429 (La. 1973).
47. 353 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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institutionalize the abuse, convert adverse medical examiners
into advocates, and shift the forum of controversy from the
courtroom to the physician's examination room. We leave the
decision to allow an attorney's presence during adverse exami-
nation to the sound discretion of the trial court.48
New York
In Reardon v. Port Authority, the court held that an attorney is permitted to
attend both physical and mental examinations as well as tape-record the proceed-
ings.49
Oregon
In Tri-Met Inc. v. Albrecht, the court found that allowing the claimant's
attorney to be present during the employer's medical examination did not consti-
tute obstruction of the medical examination which would require suspension of
workers' compensation benefits."0
Washington
In Tietjen v. Department of Labor, the court held that an attorney is allowed
to attend both physical and psychiatric examinations."
Wisconsin
In Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., the court held that an attorney's presence at
the examination is allowed. 2 The court also denied the defendants' motion to
prevent the plaintiff from tape-recording the defense's psychiatric examination
of the plaintiff, stating:
The defendants' expert is being engaged to advance the interests
of the defendants; clearly, the doctor cannot be considered a
neutral in the case. There are numerous advantages, unrelated to
the emotional damage issue, which the defendants might unfair-
ly derive from an unsupervised examination. In sum, I do not
believe that the role of the defendants' expert in the truth-seek-
ing process is sufficiently impartial to justify the license sought
by the defendants. Accordingly, the plaintiffs, at their option,
are entitled to have a third party (including counsel) or a record-
ing device at the examination.53
48. Id. at 197-98.
49. 503 N.Y.S.2d 233, 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
50. 777 P.2d 959, 960-61 (Or. 1989).
51. 534 P.2d 151, 154 (Wash. 1975).
52. 585 F. Supp. 635, 636 (E.D. Wis. 1984); See also Whanger v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d
74, 79 (Wis. 1973) (stating that the trial court can exercise its discretion in ordering the presence of counsel at
an IME upon such terms as may be just).
53. Zabkowicz, 585 F.Supp. at 636.
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It appears from the above cases that most jurisdictions allow some sort of
observation or monitoring of the IME. Mississippi courts can expect to address
this issue as practitioners seek to have a personal representative, doctor, nurse or
counsel attend the examination with the plaintiff. Moreover, our courts will
have to address whether the examination can be recorded, and if so, by what
means. Will the court allow video only, video and audio, audio only, or stenog-
rapher? The issue of recording of the examination will prove crucial to prevent
"swearing matches" as to what actually occurred during the IME and so that
counsel can adequately prepare for effective and meaningful cross-examination
of the examiner. Finally, considering the probable adverse nature of this inde-
pendent examination, a lawyer will probably have an ethical duty to prepare a
client for the examination.
Another issue that will lead to considerable litigation is just how "indepen-
dent" the examiner really is. For example, the examiner is compensated by the
party requesting the examination. Will the source of payment compromise the
examiner's judgment? The quick answer is, arguably, yes. If not, why would
the defendant need an examination independent of the examination paid for by
the plaintiff? Similarly, what if the examiner derives a substantial portion of his
or her income from the same referring party? Or, what if the examiner only per-
forms examinations for plaintiffs or for defendants? All of these questions will
become fodder for cross-examination by trial counsel, and the scope of counsel's
permissible inquiry will come before our courts. Again, other states provide
guidance on this issue.
What follows is an alphabetical review of other jurisdictions and how they
have addressed the scope of counsel's permissible inquiry upon cross-examina-
tion of the examiner. Of course, the case law cited in this section is by no means
exhaustive. Rather, it is provided to illustrate the approaches taken by other
jurisdictions to an issue Mississippi litigators and courts will face.
Alabama
In Otwell v. Bryant, the Alabama Supreme Court held that "a sufficient
degree of 'connection' [by the witness] with the liability insurance carrier" will
allow proof of this relationship as a means of attacking credibility of the witness. 4
Colorado
In Bonser v. Shainholtz, the Colorado Supreme Court held that commonality
of insurance was admissible to demonstrate possible bias.5 In Bonser, a dental
malpractice case, evidence that the dentist and his expert witness were insured
by the same insurance trust was admissible to show the witness's bias.56
54. 497 So. 2d 111, 114 (Ala. 1986).
55. 3 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. 2000).
56. Id.
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Ohio
Ede v. Atrium was a medical malpractice case in which the defendant and
the defendant's expert were both insured by the same malpractice carrier. 7 The
Ohio Supreme Court held that evidence of commonality of insurance interests is
sufficiently probative of expert bias as to clearly outweigh any potential danger
that introduction of evidence of insurance might cause."8
Oklahoma
In Mills v. Grotheer, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that cross-examina-
tion regarding insurance was improper.59 In this case there was an insufficient
connection between the expert and the insurer to justify admission where the
expert was merely a policyholder of the insurer.6"
South Carolina
In Yoho v. Thompson, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the "sub-
stantial connection analysis" and reversed a trial court that refused to allow
cross-examination regarding income derived from insurance companies.61 The
court held that the expert's connection to the defendant's insurer was sufficiently
probative to outweigh the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the jury's
knowledge that the defendant carries insurance.62
Virginia
In Rohrbaugh v. Lombard, plaintiff Rohrbaugh was injured in an automobile
accident when he was struck from behind by Lombard.63 At trial, counsel for
Rohrbaugh impeached the doctor hired by Lombard's insurance company by
questioning the doctor on the amount of income he received from insurance
companies.' 4 The Virginia Supreme Court held that this cross-examination was
proper based on the "substantial connection test."6 In other words, the doctor's
substantial connection between his income and insurance companies outweighed
the dangers of mentioning insurance before a jury.
The above cases are but some of the issues facing the Mississippi Bar with
respect to Rule 35. In reviewing the use of independent medical examinations in
other states, it becomes clear that the IME has fueled both litigation and costs
because it is axiomatic that more conflict in litigation equals more costs to the
57. 642 N.E.2d 365, 366 (Ohio 1994).
58. Id. at 368.
59. 957 P.2d 540, 542-43 (OkIa. 1998).
60. Id.
61. 548 S.E.2d 584, 586 (S.C. 2001).
62. Id.
63. 551 S.E.2d 349, 350-51 (Va. 2001).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 355-56.
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parties. If an independent medical examination is not truly independent, then the
conclusions will fuel additional litigation by bolstering a defendant that does not
want to settle (much as a non-independent report may fuel a plaintiffs claim).
Finally, at trial, the parties will now introduce more expert testimony-along with
more claims of bias-to a jury already numbed by the lack of clarity at trials.
V. CONCLUSION
Mississippi Rule 35 is here and probably here to stay. The Bar could slay a
good many trees arguing the wisdom of Rule 35, but this is pointless as the
Supreme Court has exercised its inherent authority in passing the rule. Instead,
members of the Bar should recognize potential issues arising from Rule 35 and
begin crafting solutions. This is obviously a challenge since something as
benign as an independent medical examination in the hands of overly zealous
counsel could become the next battleground within the bigger war of tort reform.
While a bit naive and certainly optimistic, hopefully the Mississippi Bar and
courts will learn from other jurisdictions which have faced the challenges of an
IME rule and apply the rule to foster resolution of cases, not increase litigation.
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